

1 **United States Climate Change Science Program**
2 **Synthesis and Assessment Product 2.2**
3 **The First State of the Carbon Cycle Report (SOCCR):**
4 **North American Carbon Budget**
5 **and Implications for the Global Carbon Cycle**

6
7 ***Executive Summary***

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18 Humans have altered the Earth's carbon budget. Beginning with the Industrial Revolution in the mid
19 1700s, but most dramatically since World War II, the human use of coal, petroleum, and natural gas has
20 released large amounts of carbon from geological deposits to the atmosphere, primarily as the combustion
21 product carbon dioxide (CO₂). Clearing of forests and plowing of grasslands for agriculture has also
22 released carbon from plants and soils to the atmosphere as carbon dioxide. Both the fossil-fuel and land-
23 use related releases are *sources* of carbon to the atmosphere. The combined rate of release is far larger
24 than can be balanced by the biological and geological processes that naturally remove carbon dioxide
25 from the atmosphere and store it in terrestrial and marine environments as part of the earth's carbon cycle.
26 These processes are known as *sinks*. Much of the carbon dioxide released through human activity has
27 "piled up" in the atmosphere, resulting in a dramatic increase in the atmospheric concentration of carbon
28 dioxide. The concentration has increased by 31% since 1850, and the present concentration is now higher
29 than at any time in the past 420,000 years. Because carbon dioxide is an important greenhouse gas, the
30 imbalance between sources and sinks and the increased concentration in the atmosphere has consequences
31 for climate and climate change.

32 North America is a major contributor to this imbalance. Among all countries, the United States,
33 Canada, and Mexico ranked, respectively, as the first, eighth, and eleventh largest emitters of carbon

1 dioxide from fossil fuels in 2002. Combined, these three countries contributed more than a quarter (27%)
2 of the world's entire fossil fuel emissions in 2002 and almost one third (32%) of the cumulative global
3 fossil fuel emissions between 1751 and 2002. In 2003, the United States accounted for 85% of North
4 America's emissions, Canada for 9%, and Mexico for 6%. Emissions from parts of Asia are increasing at
5 a growing rate and may surpass those of North America in the near future, but North America is
6 incontrovertibly a major source of atmospheric carbon dioxide, historically, at present, and in the
7 immediate future.

8 There are also important sinks of carbon in North America. Quantitative estimates of *North America*
9 sink vary widely. This report concludes that in 2003, sinks in North America took up the equivalent of
10 approximately 30% of the fossil-fuel emissions from North America. The mechanisms responsible for the
11 sinks are reasonably well known and include forest regrowth and uptake and storage (sequestration) of
12 carbon in agricultural soils; but the relative contributions, magnitudes, and future fates of these
13 mechanisms are highly uncertain. These sinks may be vulnerable to fire, changes in weather or climate,
14 and changes in land management. Some sinks might increase; some might decrease. Some might reverse
15 and switch from sink to source, as, for example, when a forest is consumed by wildfire.

16 Understanding the North American carbon budget, both sources and sinks, is critical to the United
17 States Climate Change Science Program goal of providing the best possible scientific information to
18 support public discussion, as well as government and private sector decision making, on key climate-
19 related issues. In response, this Report provides a synthesis, integration and assessment of the current
20 knowledge of the North American carbon budget and its context within the global carbon cycle. The
21 Report is organized as a response to questions relevant to carbon management and to a broad range of
22 stakeholders charged with understanding and managing energy and land use. The questions were
23 identified through early and continuing dialogue with these stakeholders, including scientists, decision
24 makers in the public and private sectors (e.g., national and sub-national government; carbon-related
25 industries, including energy, transportation, agriculture, and forestry sectors; and climate policy and
26 carbon management interest groups).

27 The questions and the answers provided by this Report are summarized below. The reader is referred
28 to the indicated chapters for further, more detailed, discussion. Unless otherwise referenced, all values,
29 statements of findings and conclusions are taken from the chapters of this Report where the attribution
30 and citation of the primary sources can be found.

31

1 **What is the carbon cycle and why should we care?**

2 The carbon cycle, described in Chapters 1 and 2, is the combination of many different physical,
3 chemical and biological processes that transfer carbon between the major storage pools (known as
4 reservoirs): the atmosphere, plants, soils, freshwater systems, oceans, and geological sediments. Hundreds
5 of millions of years ago, and over millions of years, this carbon cycle was responsible for the formation of
6 coal, petroleum, and natural gas, the fossil fuels that are the primary sources of energy for our modern
7 societies. Today, the cycling of carbon among atmosphere, land, and freshwater and marine environments
8 is in a rapid transition—an imbalance. Over tens of years, the combustion of fossil fuels is releasing into
9 the atmosphere quantities of carbon that were accumulated in the earth system over millions of years.
10 Furthermore, tropical forests that once held large quantities of carbon are being converted to agricultural
11 lands, releasing additional carbon to the atmosphere as a result. It is not surprising, then, that the
12 concentration of carbon dioxide is increasing in the atmosphere. Furthermore, these trends in fossil fuel
13 use and tropical deforestation are accelerating. The magnitude of the changes raises concerns about the
14 future behavior of the carbon cycle. Will the carbon cycle continue to function as it has in recent history,
15 or will a CO₂-caused warming result in a weakening of the ability of sinks to take up carbon dioxide,
16 leading to further warming? Drought, for example, may reduce forest growth. Warming can release
17 carbon stored in soil, and warming and drought may increase forest fires. Conversely, will elevated
18 concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere stimulate plant growth as it is known to do in
19 laboratory and field experiments and thus strengthen global or regional sinks?

20 The question is complicated because carbon dioxide is not the only substance in the atmosphere that
21 affects the earth's surface temperature and climate. Other greenhouse gases include methane (CH₄),
22 nitrous oxide, the halocarbons, and ozone, and all of these gases, together with water vapor, aerosols,
23 solar radiation, and properties of the earth's surface, are involved in the evolution of climate change.
24 Carbon dioxide, alone, is responsible for approximately 55-60% of the change in the Earth's radiation
25 balance due to increases in well-mixed atmospheric greenhouse gases and methane, for about another
26 20% (values are for the late 1990s; with a relative uncertainty of 10%; IPCC, 2001). These two gases are
27 the primary gases of the carbon cycle, with carbon dioxide being particularly important. Furthermore, the
28 consequences of increasing atmospheric carbon dioxide extend beyond climate change alone. The
29 accumulation of carbon in the oceans as a result of more than a century of fossil fuel use and deforestation
30 has increased the acidity of the surface waters, with serious consequences for corals and other marine
31 organisms that build their skeletons and shells from calcium carbonate.

32 Inevitably, the decision to influence or control atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide as a
33 means to prevent, minimize, or forestall future climate change, or to avoid damage to marine ecosystems
34 from ocean acidification, will require management of the carbon cycle. That management involves both

1 reducing sources of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere and enhancing sinks for carbon on land or in the
2 oceans. Strategies may involve both short- and long-term solutions. Short-term solutions may help to
3 slow the rate at which carbon accumulates in the atmosphere while longer-term solutions are developed.
4 In any case, formulation of options by decision makers and successful management of the earth's carbon
5 budget will require solid scientific understanding of the carbon cycle.

6 Understanding the current carbon cycle may not be enough, however. The concept of managing the
7 carbon cycle carries with it the assumption that the carbon cycle will continue to operate as it has in
8 recent centuries. A major concern is that the carbon cycle, itself, is vulnerable to land-use or climate
9 change that could bring about additional releases of carbon to the atmosphere from either land or the
10 oceans. Over recent decades both terrestrial ecosystems and the oceans have been natural sinks for
11 carbon. If either, or both, of those sinks were to become sources, slowing or reversing the accumulation of
12 carbon in the atmosphere could become much more difficult. Thus, understanding the current global
13 carbon cycle is necessary for managing carbon, but is not sufficient. Projections of the future behavior of
14 the carbon cycle in response to human activity and to climate and other environmental change are also
15 important to understanding system vulnerabilities.

16 Perhaps even more importantly, effective management of the carbon cycle requires more than basic
17 understanding of the current or future carbon cycle. It also requires cost-effective, feasible, and politically
18 palatable options for carbon management. Just as carbon cycle knowledge must be assessed and
19 evaluated, so must management options and tradeoffs. See Chapter 1 for further discussion of why the
20 general public, as well as individuals and institutions interested in carbon management, should care about
21 the carbon cycle.

22

23 **How do North American carbon sources and sinks relate to the global carbon** 24 **cycle?**

25 In 2004 North America was responsible for approximately 25% of the carbon dioxide emissions
26 produced globally by fossil fuel combustion (Chapter 2). The United States, the world's largest emitter of
27 carbon dioxide, accounted for 86% of the North American total. North America also contributed
28 approximately 30% of cumulative carbon dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel combustion (and cement
29 manufacturing) since 1750 (through 2002).

30 The contribution of North American carbon sinks to the global carbon budget is less clear. The *global*
31 terrestrial sink is quite uncertain, averaging somewhere in the range of 0 to 3800 million tons of carbon
32 per year during the 1980s, and in the range of 1000 to 3600 million tons of carbon per year in the 1990s
33 (IPCC, 2000). Analyses using global models of carbon dioxide transport in the atmosphere estimate a

1 North American sink for 1991-2000 of approximately one billion tons of carbon per year, or
2 approximately 50% of a global sink of roughly two billion tons of carbon per year.

3 This report estimates a North American sink of approximately 500 million tons of carbon per year for
4 2003, with 95% certainty that the actual value is within plus or minus 50% of that estimate, or between
5 250 and 750 million tons carbon per year (Chapter 3). That estimate is about 50% of the estimate from
6 atmospheric analyses described in Chapter 2. Year-to-year and decadal variations in the sinks in response
7 to variations in climate likely contribute to the difference (see Chapter 1). Differences in methodology
8 also likely contribute (see Chapters 2 and 3). Assuming a global terrestrial sink of approximately two
9 billion tons of carbon per year (as inferred by the atmospheric analyses for the 1990s), the North
10 American terrestrial sink reported here of approximately 500 million tons of carbon per year suggests that
11 the North American sink is perhaps 25% of the global sink. .

12 The global terrestrial sink is predominantly in northern lands; the sink north of 30° N alone is
13 estimated to be 600 to 2300 million tons of carbon per year for the 1980s (IPCC, 2001). Thus, the sink of
14 approximately 500 million tons of carbon per year in North America is consistent with the fraction of
15 northern land area in North America (37%), as opposed to Eurasia (63%).

16 It is clear that the global carbon cycle of the 21st century will continue to be influenced by large
17 fossil-fuel emissions from North America, and that the North American carbon budget will continue to be
18 dominated by the fossil-fuel sources. The future trajectory of carbon sinks in North America, and their
19 contribution to the global terrestrial sink is less certain, in part because the role of regrowing forests is
20 likely to decline as the forests mature, and in part because the response of forests and other ecosystems to
21 future climate change and increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations is uncertain. The
22 variation among model projections and scenarios of where and how future climate will change contribute
23 to that uncertainty. Additionally, response to a particular future change will likely vary among ecosystems
24 and the response will depend on a variety of incompletely understood environmental factors.

25

26 **What are the primary carbon sources and sinks in North America, and how and** 27 **why are they changing?**

28

29 ***The Sources***

30 The primary source of human-caused carbon emissions in North America that contributes to the
31 increase of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is the release of carbon dioxide during the combustion of
32 fossil fuels (Figure ES-1) (Chapter 3). Fossil fuel carbon emissions in the United States, Canada and
33 Mexico totaled approximately 1856 million tons of carbon in 2003 (with 95% confidence that the actual
34 value lies within 10% of that estimate) and have increased at an average rate of approximately 1% per

1 year for the last 30 years. The United States was responsible for approximately 85% of North America's
2 fossil fuel emissions in 2003, Canada for 9% and Mexico 6% (Table ES-1). The overall 1% growth in
3 United States emissions masks faster than 1% growth in some sectors (e.g., transportation) and slower
4 growth in others (e.g., increased manufacturing energy efficiency).

5
6 **Figure ES-1. North American carbon sources and sinks (million tons of carbon per year) in 2003.**

7 Height of a bar indicates a best estimate for net carbon exchange between the atmosphere and the indicated
8 element of the North American carbon budget. Sources add carbon dioxide to the atmosphere; sinks
9 remove it. Error bars indicate the uncertainty in that estimate, and define the range of values that include
10 the actual value with 95% certainty. See Chapter 3 and Chapters 6-15 of this report for details and
11 discussion of these sources and sinks.

12
13 **Table ES-1. North American annual net carbon emissions (source = positive) or uptake (land sink =**
14 **negative) (million tons of carbon per year) by country. See Table 3-1, Chapter 3 for references to**
15 **sources of data.**
16

17 Total United States emissions have grown at close to the North American average rate of about 1.0%
18 per year over the past 30 years, but United States per capita emissions have been roughly constant, while
19 the carbon intensity (carbon emitted/dollar of GDP) of the United States economy has decreased at a rate
20 of about 2% per year. Structural change in the economy has likely played a major role in the decline in
21 United States carbon intensity. The economy has grown at an annual rate of 2.8% over the last three
22 decades, spurred primarily by 3.6% growth in the service sector, while manufacturing grew at only 1.5%
23 per year. Because the service sector has a much lower carbon intensity than manufacturing, this faster
24 growth of services reduces the country's carbon intensity. The service sector is likely to continue to grow
25 more rapidly than other sectors of the economy; accordingly, carbon emissions will likely continue to
26 grow more slowly than GDP.

27 The extraction of fossil-fuels and other primary energy sources and their conversion to energy
28 commodities, including electricity generation, is the single largest contributor to the North American
29 fossil-fuel source, accounting for approximately 40% of North American fossil emissions in 2003
30 (Chapter 6). Electricity generation is responsible for the largest share of those emissions: approximately
31 94% in the United States in 2004, 65% in Canada in 2003, and 67% in Mexico in 1998. Again, United
32 States emissions dominate. United States emissions from electricity generation are approximately 17
33 times larger than those of Canada and 23 times those of Mexico, reflecting in part the relatively greater
34 size of the United States in both cases and its much higher level of development than Mexico.

35 More than half of electricity produced in North America (67% in the United States) is consumed in
36 buildings, making that single use one of the largest factors in North American emissions (Chapter 9). In

1 fact, the carbon dioxide emissions from United States buildings alone were greater than total carbon
2 dioxide emissions of any country in the world, except China. Energy use in buildings in the United States
3 and Canada (including the use of natural gas, wood, and other fuels as well as electricity) has increased by
4 30% since 1990, corresponding to an annual growth rate of 2.1%. In the United States, the major drivers
5 of energy consumption in the buildings sector are growth in commercial floor space and increase in the
6 size of the average home. Carbon emissions from buildings are expected to grow with population and
7 income. Furthermore, the shift from family to single-occupant households means that the number of
8 households will increase faster than population growth—each household with its own heating and cooling
9 systems and electrical appliances. Certain electrical appliances (such as air-conditioning equipment) once
10 considered a luxury are now becoming commonplace. Technology- and market-driven improvements in
11 the efficiency of appliances are expected to continue, but the improvements will probably not be
12 sufficient to curtail emissions growth in the buildings sector without government intervention.

13 The transportation sector of North America accounted for 31% of total North American emissions in
14 2003, most (87%) of it from the United States (Chapter 7). The growth in transportation and associated
15 carbon dioxide emissions has been steady during the past forty years and has been most rapid in Mexico,
16 the country most dependent upon road transport. The growth of transportation is driven by population, per
17 capita income, and economic output, and energy use in transportation is expected to increase by 46% in
18 North America between 2003 and 2025. If the mix of fuels is assumed to remain the same, carbon dioxide
19 emissions would increase from 587 million tons of carbon in 2003 to 859 million tons of carbon in 2025.

20 Emissions from North American industry (not including fossil fuel mining and processing or
21 electricity generation) are a relatively small (12%) and declining component of North America's
22 emissions (Chapter 8). Emissions decreased nearly 11% between 1990 and 2002, while energy
23 consumption in the United States and Canada increased by 8-10% during that period. In both countries, a
24 shift in production toward less energy-intensive industries and dissemination of more energy efficient
25 equipment has kept the rate of growth in energy demand lower than the rate of growth of industrial GDP.
26 Emission reductions in industry have also resulted from the voluntary, proactive initiatives of both
27 individual corporations and trade associations in response to climate change issues (see Chapter 4).

28 29 **The Sinks**

30 Approximately 30% of North American fossil fuel emissions are offset by a sink of approximately
31 530 million tons of carbon per year. The total sink is a combination of many factors, including forest
32 regrowth, fire suppression, and agricultural soil conservation (Figure ES-1) (Chapter 3, Part III: Chapters
33 10-15). The sink is currently about 500 million tons of carbon per year in the United States and
34 approximately 80 million tons of carbon per year in Canada. Mexican ecosystems are a net source of

1 about 50 million tons of carbon per year, mostly as a consequence of ongoing deforestation. The coastal
2 ocean surrounding North America is perhaps an additional small net source of carbon to the atmosphere
3 of ~20 million tons of carbon per year. The coastal ocean is, however, highly variable, and that that
4 number is highly uncertain with a variability (standard deviation) of greater than 100%. North America's
5 coastal waters could be a small sink and in some places are. How much the coastal carbon exchange with
6 the atmosphere is influenced by humans is also unknown.

7 The primary carbon sink in North America (approximately 50%) is in the forests of the United States
8 and Canada (Figure ES-1). These forests are still growing (accumulating carbon) after their re-
9 colonization of farmland 100 or more years ago. Forest regrowth takes carbon out of the atmosphere and
10 stores most of it in aboveground vegetation (wood), with as much as a third of it in soils. The suppression
11 of forest fires also increases a net accumulation of carbon in forests. As the recovering forests mature,
12 however, the rate of net carbon uptake (the sink) declines. In Canada, the estimated forest sink declined
13 by nearly a third between 1990 and 2004, but with high year-to-year variability. Over that period, the
14 annual changes in above ground carbon stored in managed Canadian forests varied from between a sink
15 of approximately 50 million tons of carbon per year to a source of approximately 40 million tons of
16 carbon per year. Years when the forests were a source were generally years with high forest fire activity.

17 Woody encroachment, the invasion of woody plants into grasslands or of trees into shrublands, is a
18 potentially large, but highly uncertain carbon sink. It is caused by a combination of fire suppression and
19 grazing. Fire inside the United States has been reduced by more than 95% from the pre-settlement levels,
20 and this reduction favors shrubs and trees in competition with grasses. The sink may be as large as 20% of
21 the North American sink, but it may also be negligible. The uncertainty of this estimate is greater than
22 100%. Woody encroachment might actually be a *source*, maybe even a relatively large one. The state of
23 the science is such that we simply don't know (see Chapter 3 and the Overview of Part III).

24 Wood products are thought to account for about 13% of the total North American sink. The
25 uncertainty in this sink is $\pm 50\%$. Wood products are a sink because they are increasing, both in use (e.g.,
26 furniture, house frames, etc.) and in landfills. The wetland sink, about 9% of the North American sink but
27 with an uncertainty of greater than 100%, is in both the peats of Canada's extensive frozen and unfrozen
28 wetlands and the mineral soils of Canadian and United States wetlands. Drainage of peatlands in the
29 United States has released carbon to the atmosphere, and the very large volume of carbon in North
30 American wetlands (the single largest carbon reservoir of any North American ecosystem) is vulnerable
31 to release in response to both climate change and the further drainage of wetlands for development. Either
32 change might shift the current modest sink to a potentially large source, although many aspects of
33 wetlands and their future behavior are poorly known.

1 Two processes determine the carbon balance of agricultural lands: management and changes in
2 environmental factors. The effects of management (e.g., cultivation, conservation tillage) are reasonably
3 well known and have been responsible for historic losses of carbon in Canada and the United States (and
4 current losses in Mexico), albeit with some increased carbon uptake and storage in recent years.

5 Agricultural lands in North America are nearly neutral with respect to carbon, with mineral soils
6 absorbing carbon and organic soils releasing it. The balance of these sinks and sources is a net sink of 10
7 ± 5 million tons of carbon per year (Fig. ES-1). The effects of climate on this balance are not well known.

8 Soil erosion leads to the accumulation of carbon containing sediments in streams, rivers and lakes
9 (both natural and man-made). This represents a carbon sink, estimated at approximately 25 million tons of
10 carbon per year for the United States. We know of no similar analysis for Canada or Mexico. The result is
11 a highly uncertain estimate for North America known to no better than 25 million tons of carbon per year
12 plus or minus more than 100%.

13 Conversion of agricultural and wildlands to cities and other human settlements reduces carbon stocks,
14 while the growth of urban and suburban trees increases them. However, the rates of carbon uptake and
15 storage in the vegetation and soils of settlements, while poorly quantified, are probably relatively small,
16 certainly in comparison to fossil fuel emissions from these areas. Thus, settlements in North America are
17 almost certainly a source of atmospheric carbon, yet the density and development patterns of human
18 settlements are drivers of fossil-fuel emissions, especially in the important residential and transportation
19 sectors.

21 **What are the direct, non-climatic effects of increasing atmospheric carbon** 22 **dioxide or other changes in the carbon cycle on the land and oceans of North** 23 **America?**

24 The potential impacts of increasing concentrations of atmospheric carbon dioxide (and other
25 greenhouse gases) on the earth's climate are well documented (IPCC, 2001) and are the dominant reason
26 for societal interest in the carbon cycle. However, the consequences of a carbon cycle imbalance and the
27 buildup of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere extend beyond climate change alone. Ocean acidification and
28 "CO₂ fertilization" of land plants are foremost among these direct, non-climatic effects.

29 The uptake of carbon by the world's oceans as a result of human activity over the last century has
30 made them more acidic (see Chapters 1 and 2). This acidification negatively impacts corals and other
31 marine organisms that build their skeletons and shells from calcium carbonate. Future changes could
32 dramatically alter the composition of ocean ecosystems of North America and elsewhere, possibly
33 eliminating coral reefs by 2100.

1 Rates of photosynthesis of many plant species often increase in response to elevated concentrations of
2 carbon dioxide, thus potentially increasing plant growth and even agricultural crop yields in the future
3 (Chapters 2, 3, 10-13). There is, however, continuing scientific debate about whether such “CO₂
4 fertilization” will continue into the future with prolonged exposure to elevated carbon dioxide, and
5 whether the fertilization of photosynthesis will translate into increased plant growth and net uptake and
6 storage of carbon by terrestrial ecosystems. Recent studies provide many conflicting results. Experimental
7 treatment with elevated carbon dioxide can lead to consistent increases in plant growth. On the other
8 hand, it can also have little effect on plant growth, with an initial stimulation of photosynthesis but limited
9 long-term effects on carbon accumulation in the plants. Moreover, it is unclear how plants and ecosystem
10 might respond simultaneously to both “CO₂ fertilization” and climate change. While there is some
11 experimental evidence that plants may use less water when exposed to elevated carbon dioxide, extended
12 deep drought or other unfavorable climatic conditions could reduce the positive effects of elevated carbon
13 dioxide on plant growth. Thus, it is far from clear that elevated concentrations of atmospheric carbon
14 dioxide have led to terrestrial carbon uptake and storage or will do so over large areas in the future.
15 Moreover, elevated carbon dioxide is known to increase methane emissions from wetlands, further
16 increasing the uncertainty in how plant response to elevated carbon dioxide will affect the global
17 atmosphere and climate.

18 The carbon cycle also intersects with a number of critical earth system processes, including the
19 cycling of both water and nitrogen. Virtually any change in the lands or waters of North America as part
20 of purposeful carbon management will consequently affect these other processes and cycles. Some
21 interactions may be beneficial. For example, an increase in organic carbon in soils is likely to increase the
22 availability of nitrogen for plant growth and enhance the water-holding capacity of the soil. Other
23 interactions, such as nutrient limitation, fire, insect attack, increased respiration from warming, may be
24 detrimental. However, very little is known about the complex web of interactions between carbon and
25 other systems at continental scales, or the effect of management on these interactions.

26

27 **What potential management options in North America could significantly affect**
28 **the North American and global carbon cycles (e.g., North American sinks and**
29 **global atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations)?**

30 Addressing imbalances in the North American and global carbon cycles requires options focused on
31 reducing carbon emissions (Chapter 4). Options focused on enhancing carbon sinks in soils and
32 vegetation can contribute as well, but their potential is far from sufficient to deal with the magnitude of
33 current imbalances.

1 Currently, options for reducing carbon emissions include:

- 2 • Reducing emissions from the transportation sector through efficiency improvement, higher prices for
3 carbon-based fuels, liquid fuels derived from vegetation (ethanol from corn or other biomass
4 feedstock, for example), and in the longer run (after 2025), hydrogen generated from non-fossil
5 sources of energy;
- 6 • Reducing the carbon emissions associated with energy use in buildings through efficiency
7 improvements and energy-saving passive design measures;
- 8 • Reducing emissions from the industrial sector through efficiency improvement, fuel-switching, and
9 innovative process designs; and
- 10 • Reducing emissions from energy extraction and conversion through efficiency improvement, fuel-
11 switching, technological change (including carbon sequestration and capture and storage) and reduced
12 demands due to increased end-use efficiency.
- 13 • Capturing the carbon dioxide emitted from fossil-fired generating units and injecting it into a suitable
14 geological formation or deep in the sea for long-term storage (carbon capture and storage).

15

16 In many cases, significant progress with such options would require a combination of technology
17 research and development, policy interventions, and information and education programs.

18 Opinions differ about the relative mitigation impact of emission reduction versus carbon
19 sequestration. Assumptions about the cost of mitigation and the policy instruments used to promote
20 mitigation significantly affect assessments of mitigation potential. For example, appropriately designed
21 carbon emission cap and trading policies could achieve a given level of carbon emissions reduction at
22 lower cost than some other policy instruments by providing incentives to use the least-cost combination
23 of mitigation/sequestration alternatives.

24 However, the evaluation of any policy instrument needs to consider technical, institutional and
25 socioeconomic constraints that would affect its implementation, such as the ability of sources to monitor
26 their actual emissions, the constitutional authority of national and/or provincial/state governments to
27 impose emissions taxes, regulate emissions and/or regulate efficiency standards. Also, practically every
28 policy (except cost-saving energy conservation options), no matter what instrument is used to implement
29 it, has a cost in terms of utilization of resources and ensuing price increases that leads to reductions in
30 output, income, employment, or other measures of economic well-being. These costs must be weighed
31 against the benefits (or avoided costs) of reducing carbon emissions. In addition to the standard reduction
32 in damages noted above, many options and measures that reduce emissions and increase sequestration
33 also have significant *co-benefits* in terms of economic efficiency, environmental management, and energy
34 security.

1 The design of carbon management systems must also consider unintended consequences
2 involving other greenhouse gases. For instance, carbon sequestration strategies such as reduced tillage can
3 increase emissions of methane and nitrous oxide, which are also greenhouse gases. Strategies for dealing
4 with climate change will have to consider these other gases as well as other components of the climate
5 systems, such as small airborne particles and the physical aspects of plant communities.

6 Direct reductions of carbon emissions from fossil fuel use are considered ‘permanent’ reductions,
7 while carbon sequestration in plants or soils is a ‘non-permanent’ reduction, in that carbon stored through
8 conservation practices could potentially be re-emitted if management practices revert back to the previous
9 state or otherwise change. This *permanence* issue applies to all forms of carbon sinks. For example, the
10 carbon sink associated with forest regrowth could be slowed or reversed from sink to source if the forests
11 are burnt in wildfires or forest harvest and management practices change.

12 In addition, a given change in land management (e.g., tillage reduction, pasture improvement,
13 afforestation) will stimulate carbon storage for only a finite period of time. Over time, as the processes of
14 carbon gain and loss from vegetation and soil comes into a new balance with the change in land
15 management, carbon storage will tend to level off at a new maximum, after which there is no further
16 accumulation (sequestration) of carbon. For example, following changes in tillage to promote carbon
17 absorption in agricultural soils (see Chapter 10) the amount of carbon in the soil will tend to reach a new
18 constant level after 15–30 years. The sink declines, then disappears, or nearly so, as the amount of carbon
19 being added to the soil is balanced by losses. The same pattern is observed as forests recover from fire,
20 harvest or other disturbance, or as forests regrowing on abandoned farmland become more mature (see
21 Chapters 3 and 11).

22 Another issue surrounding carbon uptake and storage is *leakage*, whereby mitigation actions in one
23 area (e.g., geographic region, production system) stimulate additional emissions elsewhere. For storage of
24 carbon in forests, leakage is a major concern; reducing harvest rates in one area, for example, can
25 stimulate increased cutting and reduction in stored carbon in other areas. Leakage may be of minor
26 concern for agricultural carbon storage, since most practices would have little or no effect on the supply
27 and demand of agricultural commodities.

28 Options and measures can be implemented in a variety of ways at a variety of scales, not only at
29 international or national levels. For example, a number of municipalities, state governments, and private
30 firms in North America have made commitments to voluntary greenhouse gas emission reductions. For
31 cities, one focus has been the Cities for Climate Protection program of International Governments for
32 Local Sustainability (formerly ICLEI). For some states and provinces, the Regional Greenhouse Gas (Cap
33 and Trade) Initiative is nearing implementation. For industry, one focus has been membership in the Pew
34 Center and in the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Climate Leaders Program.

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How can we improve the usefulness of carbon science for decision making?

Effective carbon management requires that relevant, appropriate science be communicated to the wide variety of people whose decisions affect carbon cycling (Chapter 5). Because the field is relatively new and the demand for policy-relevant information has been limited, carbon cycle science has rarely been organized or conducted to inform carbon management. To generate information that can systematically inform carbon management decisions, scientists and decision makers need to clarify what information would be most relevant in specific sectors and arenas for carbon management, adjust research priorities as necessary, and develop mechanisms that enhance the credibility and legitimacy of the information being generated.

In the United States, the Federal carbon science enterprise does not yet have many mechanisms to assess emerging demands for carbon information across scales and sectors. Federally funded carbon science has focused predominantly on basic research to reduce uncertainties about the carbon cycle. Initiatives are now underway to promote coordinated, interdisciplinary research that is strategically prioritized to address societal needs. The need for this type of research is increasing. Interest in carbon management across sectors suggests that there may be substantial demand for information in the energy, transportation, agriculture, forestry and industrial sectors, at scales ranging from local to global.

To ensure that carbon science is as useful as possible for decision making, carbon scientists and carbon managers need to create new forums and institutions for communication and coordination. Research suggests that in order to make a significant contribution to management, scientific and technical information intended for decision making must be perceived not only as credible (worth believing), but also as salient (relevant to decision making on high priority issues) and legitimate (conducted in a way that stakeholders believe is fair, unbiased and respectful of divergent views and interests). To generate information that meets these tests, carbon stakeholders and scientists need to collaborate to develop research questions, design research strategies, and review, interpret and disseminate results. Transparency and balanced participation are important for guarding against politicization and enhancing usability.

To make carbon cycle science more useful to decision makers in the United States and elsewhere in North America, leaders in the carbon science community might consider the following steps:

- Identify specific categories of decision makers for whom carbon cycle science is likely to be salient, focusing on policy makers and private sector managers in carbon-intensive sectors (energy, transport, manufacturing, agriculture and forestry);
- Identify and evaluate existing information about carbon impacts of decisions and actions in these arenas, and assess the need and demand for additional information. In some cases, demand may need to be nurtured and fostered through a two-way interactive process;

- 1 • Encourage scientists and research programs to experiment with new and different ways of making
- 2 carbon cycle science more salient, credible, and legitimate to carbon managers;
- 3 • Involve not just physical or biological disciplines in scientific efforts to produce useable science, but
- 4 also social scientists, economists, and communication experts; and
- 5 • Consider initiating participatory pilot research projects and identifying existing “boundary
- 6 organizations” (or establishing new ones) to bridge carbon management and carbon science.

7

8 **What additional knowledge is needed for effective carbon management?**

9 Scientists and carbon managers need to improve their joint understanding of the top priority questions
10 facing carbon-related decision-making. Priority needs specific to individual ecosystem or sectors are
11 described in Chapters 6-15 of this report. To further prioritize those needs across disciplines and sectors,
12 scientists need to collaborate more effectively with decision makers in undertaking research and
13 interpreting results in order to answer those questions. To improve this understanding, more deliberative
14 processes of consultation with potential carbon managers at all scales can be initiated at various stages of
15 the research process. This might include workshops, focus groups, working panels, and citizen advisory
16 groups. Research on the effective production of science that can be used for decision making suggests that
17 ongoing, iterative processes that involve decision makers are more effective than those that do not (Lemos
18 and Morehouse 2005).

19 In the light of changing views on the impacts of CO₂ released to the atmosphere, research and
20 development will likely focus on the extraction of energy while preventing CO₂ release. Fossil fuels
21 might well remain economically competitive and socially desirable as a source of energy in some
22 circumstances, even when one includes the extra cost of capturing the CO₂ and preventing its atmospheric
23 release when converting these fuels into non-carbon secondary forms of energy like electricity, hydrogen
24 or heat. Research and development needs in the energy and conversion arena include clarifying potentials
25 for carbon capture and storage, exploring how to make renewable energy affordable at large scales of
26 deployment, examining societal concerns about nuclear energy, and learning more about policy options
27 for distributed energy and energy transitions. There is also need for better understanding of the public
28 acceptability of policy incentives for reducing dependence on carbon intensive energy sources.

29 In the transportation sector, improved data on Mexican greenhouse gas emissions and trends is
30 needed, as well as the potential for mitigating transportation-related emissions in North America and
31 advances in transportation mitigation technologies and policies. In the industry and waste management
32 sectors, work on materials substitution and energy efficient technologies in production processes holds
33 promise for greater emissions reductions. Needs for the building sector include further understanding the
34 total societal costs of CO₂ as an externality of buildings costs, economic and market analyses of various

1 reduced emission features at various time scales of availability, and construction of cost curves for
2 emission reduction options.

3 Turning to the ecosystem arena, in agricultural and grazing land sectors inventories still carry a
4 great deal of uncertainty, especially in the arena of woody encroachment. If such inventories are to be the
5 basis for future decision making, reducing such uncertainties may be a useful investment. Quantitative
6 estimates of land use change and the impact of various management practices are also highly uncertain, as
7 are the interactions among carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide as greenhouse gas emissions. If
8 carbon accounting becomes a critical feature of carbon management, improved data are needed on the
9 relationship of forest management practices to carbon storage, as well as inexpensive tools and techniques
10 for monitoring. An assessment of agroforestry practices in Mexico as well as in temperate landscapes
11 would also be helpful. Importantly, there is a need for multi-criteria analysis of various uses of
12 landscapes—tradeoffs between carbon storage and other uses of the land must be considered. If markets
13 emerge more fully for trading carbon credits, the development of such decision support tools will likely
14 be encouraged.

15 Soils in the permafrost region store vast amounts of carbon, but there is little certainty about how
16 these soils will respond to changes brought about by climate. While these regions are likely not subject to
17 management options, improved information on carbon storage and the trajectory of these reservoirs may
18 provide additional insight into the likelihood of release of large amounts of carbon to the atmosphere that
19 may affect global decision making. Similarly, there is great uncertainty in the response of the carbon
20 pools of wetlands to climate changes, and very little data on freshwater mineral soils and estuarine carbon
21 both in Canada and Mexico.

22 With respect to human settlements, additional studies of the carbon balance of settlements of
23 varying densities, geographical location, and patterns of development are needed to quantify the potential
24 impacts of various policy and planning alternatives on net greenhouse gas emissions. Finally, in the
25 coastal regions, additional information on carbon fluxes will help to constrain continental carbon balance
26 estimates should information on that scale become useful for decision making. Research on ocean carbon
27 uptake and storage is also needed in order to fully inform decision making on options for carbon
28 management.

29 With respect to carbon management, there is a need for more insight into how incentives to reduce
30 emissions affect the behavior of households and businesses, the influence of reducing uncertainty on the
31 willingness of decision makers to make commitments, the affect of increased R& D spending on
32 technological innovation, the socioeconomic distribution of mitigation/sequestration costs and benefits,
33 and the manner in which mitigation costs and policy instrument design affect the macroeconomy.
34 Improvements in decision analysis in the face of irreducible uncertainty would be helpful as well.

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1
2 **Table ES-1. North American annual net carbon emissions (source = positive) or uptake (land sink =**
3 **negative) (million tons carbon per year) by country. See Table 3-1, Chapter 3 for references to sources of**
4 **data.**

Source (positive) or Sink (negative)	United States	Canada	Mexico	North America
<i>Fossil source (positive)</i>				
Fossil fuel (oil, gas, coal)	1582 ^{*****} (681, 328, 573)	164 ^{*****} (75, 48, 40)	110 ^{*****} (71, 29, 11)	1856 ^{*****} (828, 405, 624)
<i>Nonfossil carbon sink (negative) or source (positive)</i>				
Forest	-259 ^{***}	-47 ^{***}	+52 ^{**}	-254 ^{***}
Wood products	-57 ^{***}	-11 ^{***}	ND	-68 ^{***}
Woody encroachment	-120 [*]	ND	ND	-120 [*]
Agricultural soils	-8 ^{***}	-2 ^{***}	ND	-10 ^{***}
Wetlands	-23 [*]	-23 [*]	-4 [*]	-49 [*]
Rivers and lakes	-25 ^{**}	ND	ND	-25 [*]
Total carbon source or sink	-492 ^{***}	-83 ^{**}	48 [*]	-526 ^{***}
<i>Net carbon source (positive)</i>	1090 ^{*****}	81 ^{***}	158 ^{**}	1330 ^{*****}

5
6 Uncertainty:

7 ***** (95% confidence within 10%)

8 **** (95% confidence within 25%)

9 *** (95% confidence within 50%)

10 ** (95% confidence within 100%)

11 * (95% confidence bounds >100%)

12 ND = No data available

13




Figure ES-1. North American carbon sources and sinks (million tons carbon per year) circa 2003. Height of a bar indicates a best estimate for net carbon exchange between the atmosphere and the indicated element of the North American carbon budget. Sources add carbon dioxide to the atmosphere; sinks remove it. Error bars indicate the uncertainty in that estimate, and define the range of values that include the actual value with 95% certainty. See Chapter 3 and Chapters 6-15 of this report for details and discussion of these sources and sinks.

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